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Abstract. We examine n-player stochastic games. These are dynamic games
where a play evolves in stages along a finite set of states; at each stage players
independently have to choose actions in the present state and these choices
determine a stage payoff to each player as well as a transition to a new state
where actions have to be chosen at the next stage. For each player the infinite
sequence of his stage payoffs is evaluated by taking the limiting average.
Normally stochastic games are examined under the condition of full moni-
toring, i.e. at any stage each player observes the present state and the actions
chosen by all players. This paper is a first attempt towards understanding
under what circumstances equilibria could exist in n-player stochastic games
without full monitoring. We demonstrate the non-existence of e-equilibria in
n-player stochastic games, with respect to the average reward, when at each
stage each player is able to observe the present state, his own action, his own
payoff, and the payoffs of the other players, but is unable to observe the
actions of them. For this purpose, we present and examine a counterexample
with 3 players. If we further drop the assumption that the players can observe
the payoffs of the others, then counterexamples already exist in games with
only 2 players.
1 Introduction
Stochastic games can be seen as multi-player Markov decision processes. A
stochastic game canbedescribedby (1) a nonempty andfinite set of players I ; (2)
a nonempty and finite set of states S, (3) for each state s; a nonempty and finite
set of actions AiðsÞ for each player i, (4) for each state s and each joint action
a 2 i2I AiðsÞ, a payoff riðs; aÞ 2 R to each player i, (5) for each state s and each
joint action a 2 i2I AiðsÞ, a transition probability vector pðs; aÞ ¼ ðpðtjs; aÞÞt2S .
The game is to be played at stages in N in the following way. The play starts at
Math Meth Oper Res (2003) 58:459–475
DOI 10.1007/s001860300293
Stochastic games with non-observable actions
J. Flesch, F. Thuijsman, O.J. Vrieze
Department of Mathematics, Maastricht University, P.O.Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht,
The Netherlands
Manuscript received: December 2002/Final version received: April 2003
stage 1 in an initial state, say in state s1 2 S, where, simultaneously and inde-
pendently, each player i is to choose an action ai1 2 Aiðs1Þ. These choices induce
an immediate payoff riðs1; ðaj1Þj2IÞ to player i, and next, the playmoves to a new
state according to the probability vector pðs1; ðaj1Þj2IÞ, say to state s2.At stage 2 a
new action ai2 2 Aiðs2Þ is to be chosen by each player i in state s2. Then player i
receives payoff riðs2; ðaj2Þj2IÞ and the play moves to some state s3 according to
the probability vector pðs2; ðaj2Þj2IÞ, and so on.
A stochastic game is usually played under the assumption of full moni-
toring:
Assumption of full monitoring: each player is able to observe the present state,
his own action and the actions of the other players. So, a history for player
i 2 I up to stage n is of the form:
hiðnÞ ¼ ðs1; ðaj1Þj2I ; . . . ; sn; ðajnÞj2IÞ:
Notice that, under the assumption of full monitoring, the histories of the
players coincide.
A mixed action xiðsÞ for player i in state s is a probability distribution on
AiðsÞ: The set of mixed actions for player i in state s is denoted by X iðsÞ. A
(history dependent or behavior) strategy ri for player i is a decision rule that,
for the choice of action, prescribes a mixed action riðs; hiÞ 2 X iðsÞ in the
present state s depending on his past history hi. If the mixed actions pre-
scribed by a strategy only depend on the present state and stage then the
strategy is called Markov, while if they only depend on the present state then
the strategy is called stationary.
A joint strategy r ¼ ðriÞi2I together with an initial state s 2 S determines a
stochastic process on the payoffs. The sequences of payoffs are evaluated by
the average reward, which is given for player i 2 I by


















where Esr stands for expectation and where Rin is a random variable for the
payoff for player i at stage n.
A joint strategy r ¼ ðriÞi2I is called an e-equilibrium, e  0, with respect to
the average reward, if for each player i 2 I and initial state s 2 S
ci s; ri; ðrjÞj2Infig
 
 ci s; rð Þ þ e 8ri;
which means that no player can gain more than e by a unilateral deviation, for
any initial state s 2 S. Hence, for small e, the rewards corresponding to an
e-equilibrium are an appealing solution of the stochastic game.
Under the assumption of full monitoring, the famous game called the Big
Match, in Gillette (1957) and Blackwell & Ferguson (1968), showed that 0-
equilibria do not always exist and history dependent strategies are indis-
pensable for obtaining e-equilibria, with e > 0. However the existence of
e-equilibria for all e > 0 is not yet known in general and is the most chal-
lenging open problem these days, even though the existence problem has been
answered in the affirmative for several special classes, such as for games with
only two players (cf. Vieille (2000, I and II)).
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As far as we know, non zero-sum stochastic games have always been
studied with the assumption of full monitoring. So the question arises what
happens if the assumption of full monitoring is dropped. We shall therefore
examine the following two weaker assumptions:
Assumption 1: each player is able to observe the present state, his own action,
his own payoff, and the payoffs of the other players. So, a history for player
i 2 I up to stage n is of the form
hiðnÞ ¼ ðs1; ai1; ðu
j
1Þj2I ; . . . ; sn; ain; ðujnÞj2IÞ;
where ujk denotes the payoff for player j at stage k.
Assumption 2: each player is able to observe the present state, his own action
and his own payoff. So, a history for player i 2 I up to stage n is of the form
hiðnÞ ¼ ðs1; ai1; ui1; . . . ; sn; ain; uinÞ;
where uik denotes the payoff for player i at stage k:
Notice that Assumption 1 is somewhat weaker than the assumption of full
monitoring, because if a player can observe all the actions then he can con-
clude all the payoffs. Vieille (2000, III) recently managed to show that, in this
case, each two-player stochastic game has at least one initial state for which
e-equilibria exist for all e > 0: Despite this result, we will show that stochastic
games do not always admit e-equilibria for all initial states, which shall be
demonstrated by a counterexample with 3 players. Consequently, for
obtaining e-equilibria, the players should be able to gain more information
during the play of the game than under Assumption 1. It is not clear whether
or not a counterexample exists with only 2 players.
Obviously, Assumption 2 is the weakest amongst the assumptions above.
Under this assumption counterexamples already exist in games with only 2
players. Such an example shall also be analyzed below.
The idea that the players cannot fully monitor the behavior of their
opponents is not new. However, the earlier studies on stochastic games
without full monitoring always focused on the zero-sum case, see for instance
Coulomb (1992, 1999). Thus, our goal is to provide a first step towards
understanding under what circumstances equilibria could exist in n -player
stochastic games with non-observable actions.
Absorbing games. Both counterexamples we will present below are so-called
absorbing games. These are very special stochastic games with the properties
that all the states but one are absorbing (play remains there forever,
regardless the actions chosen by the players) and in any absorbing state each
player has only one action. Note that if the play moves to an absorbing state s
(absorption occurs in state sÞ then the play is strategically over and the
average rewards of the players will equal the payoffs in state s.
In these absorbing games, since the non-absorbing state is the only non-
trivial state, we will assume that it is the initial state and we will surpress the
states in the notations. For a (history dependent) strategy ri for player i, the
prescribed mixed action after past history hi (if no absorption has occured) is
denoted by riðhiÞ, while for a Markov strategy ri; the mixed action for stage n
is riðnÞ. The probability on action ai is denoted by riðhi; aiÞ or riðn; aiÞ;
respectively.
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For convenience, let t denote the random variable for the stage of
absorption; if no absorption occurs at all, then let t ¼ 1: Moreover, with
regard to a joint Markov strategy r ¼ rjð Þj2I , we use the notation ri r nð Þð Þ
for the expected payoff of player i with respect to the joint mixed action r nð Þ
given absorption occurs.
2 A counterexample under Assumption 2
Example 1. Under Assumption 2, consider the following game with 2 players:
In this game, player 1’s actions are the rows (Top andBottom) and player 2’s
actions are the columns (Left and Right). Entries (Top, Left) and (Top, Right)
are non-absorbing, meaning that after the players receive the payoffs the play
remains in the non-absorbing state. On the other hand, entries (Bottom, Left)
and (Bottom, Right) are absorbing with probability 1 (indicated by ), meaning
that the play moves to an absorbing state whose payoffs are given in this entry.
(This game shows some similarity with the Big Match, cf. Gillette (1957).)
Notice that player 1 can determine the time of absorption, but it is player 2
who determines the place of it. Also, if player 1 plays Top then no absorption
occurs and due to Assumption 2, player 2’s behavior is completely invisible to
player 1; while as soon as player 1 plays Bottom, absorption occurs with
probability 1.
Based on the above observations we will now show the following lemma,
which says that player 1 has only Markov strategies at his disposal, while
player 2 can also restrict himself to using Markov strategies, in a certain
sense.
Lemma 1. Consider example 1 (under Assumption 2).
1. Any strategy r1 of player 1 is simply a Markov strategy.
2. For any strategy r2 of player 2, there exists a Markov strategy r2 so that for
any strategy r1 of player 1
ci r1; r2
 
¼ ci r1; r2
 
8i 2 I ¼ 1; 2f g:
Proof. Part 1. If the play is at stage n and no absorption has occured, then
player 1’s history must be
h1ðn 1Þ ¼ ðTop; 0; . . . ;Top; 0Þ:
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Hence, the only information such a history carries is its ‘‘length’’ n 1; or
equivalently that the present stage is n. This means that player 1 can only have
Markov strategies, indeed.
Part 2. Take an arbitrary strategy r2 for player 2. Let qn be the probability of
playing Left at stage n with respect to r2, given that no absorption has
occurred. Note that this probability is independent of the strategy of player 1,
since, as long as no absorption occurs, player 1’s actions have been Top at all
stages. Let r2 be the Markov strategy where player 2 plays ðqn; 1 qnÞ at





Hence the average rewards are the same as well. h
The following corollary will make it sufficient to deal with Markov
e-equilibria.
Corollary 2. Consider example 1 (under Assumption 2). Suppose there exists an
e-equilibrium for some e  0: Then, there must also exist a Markov e-equilib-
rium.
Proof. Suppose r1; r2
 
is an e-equilibrium for some e  0. For r2, take a
Markov strategy r2 as in part 2 of lemma 1. Then by lemma 1, the pair
ðr1; r2Þ must be a Markov e-equilibrium. h
The main result of this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Consider example 1 (under Assumption 2). There exists no
e-equilibrium for e 2 ½0; 18Þ.
Proof. Suppose the opposite. Then by corollary 2 we should have a Markov
e-equilibrium ðr1; r2Þ for some e 2 ½0; 18Þ. We will subsequently derive a con-
tradiction in several steps.
 Step 1. c1(r1; r2Þ   e
Observe that player 1 can guarantee 0 by playing the stationary strategy






 c1 x; r2
 
 e ¼  e:
 Step 2. c2ðr1;r2Þ  1 e
(The arguments below are similar to ones used in the study of the Big Match
by Gillette (1957) and by Blackwell & Ferguson (1968).)
Since
Pr1 t
 <1ð Þ ¼ lim
n!1
Pr1 t




Pr1 n < t
 <1ð Þ ¼ lim
n!1
Pr1 t
 <1ð Þ  Pr1 t  nð Þ½  ¼ 0: ð1Þ
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Let d > 0 be arbitrary. By (1), there must exist a stage nd such that
Pr1 nd < t
 <1ð Þ  d:
Consider the Markov strategy s2d for player 2 which prescribes action Right
for stages 1; . . . ; nd and action Left at all further stages.
Then, with respect to r1; s2d
 
; the following 3 events can occur:
(i) Absorption takes place in entry (Bottom, Right) at some stage in
1; . . . ; nd;
(ii) Absorption takes place in entry (Bottom, Left) at some stage in
nd þ 1; nd þ 2; :::;
(iii) No absorption occurs at all, and entry (Top, Left) is played at all stages
in nd þ 1; nd þ 2; :::
By the choice of nd; event (ii) has probability at most d , hence
c2 r1; s2d
 
 1 d: Due to the fact that r1; r2
 
is an e-equilibrium, we have
c2 r1; r2
 
 c2 r1; s2d
 
 e  1 d e:
Since d > 0 was arbitrary, the proof of step 2 is complete.
 Step 3. the probability of absorbtion in entry (Bottom, Left) is at most e
with respect to ðr1; r2Þ
It follows immediately from step 2.
 Step 4. c1ðr1;r2Þ  e
It is a consequence of step 3.
 Step 5. the probability of absorbtion in cell (Bottom, Right) is at most 2e
with respect to ðr1; r2Þ
It is an easy implication of steps 1 and 3.
 Step 6. there exists a stage n for which r2ðn; LeftÞ  1 3e
Suppose by way of contradiction that r2ðn; LeftÞ < 1 3e for all n 2 N:
Let w denote the overall probability of absorption in entry (Bottom,
Right), with respect to r1; r2
 
. Then by using step 5, we must have
w  2e: Hence
c2 r1; r2
 
< w  1þ ð1 wÞ 1 3eð Þ  2eþ 1 3eð Þ ¼ 1 e;
which is in contradiction with step 2.
 Step 7. Deriving a contradiction
Take a stage n as in step 6. Consider a Markov strategy s1 for player 1 which




¼ 1  r2 n;Leftð Þ  1  r2 n;Rightð Þ
¼ 2  r2 n;Leftð Þ  1
 2  1 3eð Þ  1
¼ 1 6e:
By using e 2 ½0; 18Þ and step 4, this implies
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c1 s1; r2
 
 1 6e > 1
4
> 2e  c1 r1; r2
 
þ e;
which is a contradiction, as r1; r2
 
should be an e-equilibrium: Therefore,
the proof is complete. h
Remark. Consider now example 1 under the stronger Assumption 1 (or the
assumption of full monitoring). Notice that, in this case, player 1 can con-
clude the past actions of player 2, since player 2’s payoffs are different in
entries (Top, Left) and (Top, Right). Therefore, the approach in Vrieze &
Thuijsman (1989) is directly applicable to proving the existence of e-equilib-
ria, for all e > 0:
3 A counterexample under Assumption 1
Example 2. Under Assumption 1, consider the following game with 3 play-
ers:
This is in fact a cubic 3-player game, in which each player has 3 actions: the
actions of player 1 are the rows, the actions of player 2 are the columns and
the actions of player 3 are the blocks. The interpretation is further similar to
that of example 1.
Observe that the payoff and the transition structures are cyclically sym-
metric, namely it holds for any entry a1; a2; a3
 
2 1; 2; 3f g3 that
(i) r1 a1; a2; a3
 
¼ r2 a3; a1; a2
 
¼ r3 a2; a3; a1
 
(ii) entries a1; a2; a3
 
; a3; a1; a2
 
; a2; a3; a1
 
are all absorbing or non-
absorbing simultaneously.
However, we wish to emphasize that we have only introduced this cyclic
symmetry to make the analysis of this game clearer.
In the above game, as long as all the players choose their first or second
action all the payoffs equal 0 and no absorption occurs; while as soon as at
least one player chooses his third action, absorption occurs with probability 1.
We will show for example 2 under Assumption 1 that there exist no
e-equilibria for small e > 0 (cf. theorem 10). We will now convey the main
ideas lying behind the proof.
Idea of the proof. For the sake of simplicity we only explain why 0-equilibria
fail to exist. Then the general proof for e-equilibria goes along similar lines
(even though it is more technical). We shall now sketch the steps and the
arguments and give the formal proofs thereafter.
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Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists a 0-equilibrium. We
will show that this would imply the existence of a Markov 0-equilibrium
(cf. corollary 5). The advantage of dealing with Markov strategies
only is, that it is much easier to examine deviations, because such do not
effect the behavior of the other players. With respect to a Markov
0-equilibrium we derive a number of steps, which will finally lead to a
contradiction.
Because the absorbing payoffs are mainly positive, the first two steps cause
no real difficulties.
 Step 1. Absorption must occur with probability 1 (cf. lemma 7).
 Step 2. Each player’s average reward is positive (cf. part 1 of lemma 8).
Notice that absorption cannot occur in entries with payoffs (1,1,1) with
probability 1, because at least one player could always improve his reward by
switching to action 1 and receive payoff 3 with a good chance. Hence, step 1
implies that absorption must have a positive probability in at least one other
absorbing entry. By looking at the sum of the payoffs in each absorbing entry,
this implies that the sum of the average rewards must be larger than 3. This
observation brings us to the following conclusion.
 Step 3. The average reward for at least one player is larger than 1 (cf. part 2
of lemma 8).
Due to symmetry, we may now assume that player 3’s reward is more than
1. It is therefore also reasonable to assume that at stage 1 absorption occurs
with positive probability and player 3’s reward given absorption at stage 1 is
larger than 1 (if it is not the case for stage 1, then we could do the same
with the first stage which satisfies this property). Let x; y and z denote the
mixed actions for stage 1. Under the two previous assumptions we proceed
as follows. Player 3 surely does not use action 3, as it offers a reward at
most 1. Also, action 2 is worse than action 1 for player 3, because his
reward given absorption is at most 1 if he selects action 2. Hence the
following conclusion.
 Step 4. zð1Þ ¼ 1; zð2Þ ¼ zð3Þ ¼ 0 (cf. part 1 of lemma 9).
Now, we only need to look at the first block of the game. We will first
derive that yð3Þ ¼ 0. Assume, by way of contradiction, that yð3Þ > 0. Then,
because of step 4, action 1 is worse than action 2 for player 1, hence
xð1Þ ¼ 0. But then step 2 would imply yð3Þ ¼ 0; which is a contradiction. So
yð3Þ ¼ 0 indeed.
Since we assume that the probability of absorption is positive, we con-
clude that xð3Þ > 0, and therefore yð2Þ ¼ 0 since action 1 gives player 2 a
higher absorbing payoff. Thus, from steps 2 and 4, we have derived:
 Step 5. yð1Þ ¼ 1, yð2Þ ¼ yð3Þ ¼ 0 (cf. part 2 of lemma 9).
To conclude the sketch of the proof, the final argument is as follows (cf.
proof of theorem 10). Recall the assumption that player 3’s reward given
absorption at stage 1 is more than 1. Then notice that steps 4 and 5 only
allow absorption in entry (3,1,1) with payoff 0 for player 3, which is a
contradiction. Therefore no 0-equilibrium exists for example 2 under
Assumption 1.
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We will now turn to the formal proofs. We will often deal with sequences
in compact spaces. We shall assume that these sequences are convergent,
because we may restrict to a convergent subsequence otherwise.
Based on the property that all the payoffs in the non-absorbing entries
are the same (namely 0), one can show the following lemma similarly to part 2
of lemma 1. It says that, essentially, it is sufficient to deal with Markov
strategies.
Lemma 4. Consider example 2 (under Assumption 1). For any strategy r1 of
player 1, there exists a Markov strategy r1 so that for any strategies r2 and r3
of players 2 and 3
ci r1; r2; r3
 
¼ ci r1; r2; r3
 
8i 2 I ¼ 1; 2; 3f g:
A similar statement holds for the other players, as well.
The next corollary can be shown analogously to corollary 2.
Corollary 5. Consider example 2 (under Assumption 1). Suppose there exists an
e-equilibrium for some e  0: Then, there must also exist a Markov e-equilib-
rium.
The following lemma deals with the tails of Markov e-equilibria.
Lemma 6. Consider example 2 (under Assumption 1). Let r1; r2; r3
 
be a
Markov e-equilibrium for some e  0. Let n 2 N and suppose that stage n is
reached with positive probability, i.e.
P r1;r2;r3ð Þ t
  nð Þ > 0:
For any player i, let rijn be the Markov strategy which equals the tail of ri
starting from stage n :
rijn mð Þ :¼ ri mþ n 1ð Þ 8m 2 N:
Then r1jn; r2jn; r3jn
 
is a Markov d-equilibrium with
d ¼ e
P r1;r2;r3ð Þ t  nð Þ
:
Proof. The proof is quite straightforward. Assume by way of contradiction
that r1jn; r2jn; r3jn
 
is no d-equilibrium: Then, there must exist a player, say
player 1, with a strategy s1 such that
c1 s1; r2jn; r3jn
 
 c1 r1jn; r2jn; r3jn
 
> d:
Now consider the Markov strategy r1 for player 1 which coincides with r1 up
to stage n 1 and starts to play s1 afterwards. Then we have
c1 r1; r2; r3
 
 c1 r1; r2; r3
 
¼ P r1;r2;r3ð Þ t  nð Þ  c1 s1; r2jn; r3jn
 
c1 r1jn; r2jn; r3jn
 
> P r1;r2;r3ð Þ t
  nð Þ  d
¼ e;
which contradicts the assumption that r1; r2; r3
 
is an e-equilibrium. h
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Next, we observe that absorption should occur almost certainly with re-
spect to Markov e-equilibria, with small e > 0:
Lemma 7. Consider example 2 (under Assumption 1). Let r1; r2; r3
 
be a















Proof. It can be checked that, with respect to any joint mixed action, there is
at least one player who can get at least 12 by playing action 3. (Take player 1 if
player 3 plays action 1 with probability at least 12, and take player 2 other-
wise.) Therefore, there is always one player who would rather stop play than









> e , contradicting that
r1; r2; r3
 
is an e-equilibrium. Hence the result. h
The next lemma derives some bounds for rewards corresponding to
Markov e-equilibria.
Lemma 8. Consider example 2 (under Assumption 1). There exist e > 0 and
M > 0 such that for any e 2 0;e½  and any Markov e-equilibrium r1; r2; r3
 
we
have the following two properties:
1. for all players i 2 1; 2; 3f g
ci r1; r2; r3
 
 2M ;
2. there is a player i 2 1; 2; 3f g such that
ci r1; r2; r3
 
 1þ 2M :






be an arbitrary sequence of Markov ek-equilibria, for a
positive sequence ek converging to 0. First we derive some general observa-
tions.
For any a1; a2; a3
 
2 1; 2; 3f g3; let wk a1; a2; a3
 
denote the overall














wk a1; a2; a3
 
(by taking a subsequence, the above limits exist).
Now, let E denote the set of absorbing entries of the game, i.e.
E ¼ 1; 2; 3f g3 1; 2f g3.






 <1ð Þ ¼
X
a1;a2;a3ð Þ2E
wk a1; a2; a3
 
(note that summation is taken over absorbing entries only). Therefore, by
lemma 7
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X
a1;a2;a3ð Þ2E

















As all the payoffs in the non-absorbing entries equal 0, we have for all players
i 2 1; 2; 3f g









wk a1; a2; a3
 














w a1; a2; a3
 
ri a1; a2; a3
 
:
Obviously, it suffices to find an e and an M for properties 1 and 2 separately.
We will first show statement (2) of the lemma and then continue with state-
ment (1).
Proof of statement 2. Suppose this statement is false. Then, there exists a
positive sequence ek converging to 0 and a sequence of Markov ek-equilibria
ðr1k ; r2k ; r3kÞ so that
lim
k!1






















w a1; a2; a3
  X
i2 1;2;3f g

















a1;a2;a3ð Þ2 2;3f g3 2;2;2ð Þf g½ 
w a1; a2; a3
 
¼ 1 ð5Þ
(here the summation is taken over all absorbing entries in which the sum of
the payoffs equals 3).
We distinguish two cases. In each case we derive a contradiction by finding
a player with a profitable deviation.
 Case 1. w 2; 3; 2ð Þ þ w 2; 2; 3ð Þ þ wð2; 3; 3Þ > 0 or wð3; 2; 2Þ þ wð2; 2; 3Þþ
wð3; 2; 3Þ > 0 or wð3; 2; 2Þ þ wð2; 3; 2Þ þ wð3; 3; 2Þ > 0
By symmetry, we may assume without loss of generality that
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w 2; 3; 2ð Þ þ w 2; 2; 3ð Þ þ w 2; 3; 3ð Þ > 0:
Clearly (5) yields wð2; 3; 1Þ ¼ 0. Note that the payoffs for player 1 in entries
ð1; 3; 2Þ; ð1; 2; 3Þ; ð1; 3; 3Þ are all equal to 3, while the payoffs in entries
ð2; 3; 2Þ; ð2; 2; 3Þ; ð2; 3; 3Þ are all equal to 1. This implies that, for k sufficiently
large (or equivalently ek sufficiently small), player 1 allows for absorption
through his second action while absorption through his first action would
yield a higher payoff, namely 3 instead of 1. This contradicts the fact that the







 Case 2. wð3; 3; 3Þ = 1
This can only happen if, for k sufficiently large (or equivalently ek sufficiently
small), there exists a stage such that the players play their third action
simultaneously with probability almost 1. Then by using that the payoff for
player 1 is higher in entry ð1; 3; 3Þ than in ð3; 3; 3Þ, we again derive a con-







Proof of statement 1. Suppose this statement is false. Then, there exists a
positive sequence ek converging to 0 and a sequence of Markov ek-equilibria
ðr1k ; r2k ; r3kÞ so that
lim
k!1


















Then just like for (5) in the proof of part 1, one can show that
w 1; 3; 1ð Þ þ wð3; 1; 2Þ þ w 3; 1; 3ð Þ ¼ 1:
We distinguish three cases. In each case we derive a contradiction by finding a
player with a profitable deviation.
 Case 1. w 1; 3; 1ð Þ > 0
Clearly impossible because player 1 could get a positive reward by shifting all
the weights from action 1 to action 2, for which all absorbing entries give
positive payoffs. Especially entry ð2; 3; 1Þ will appear with positive probabil-
ity, giving player 1 a payoff 12.
 Case 2. w 3; 1; 3ð Þ > 0
The proof is similar to case 1, but now player 1 has to shift weight from action
3 to action 2.












and also that there must be a stage at which player 2 plays his first action with
probability almost 1. It is now player 3 who can deviate in a profitable way by
playing action 3 at that stage, which gives him 1. h
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Next we derive for Markov e-equilibria some properties on the
overall probability of absorption in certain entries. Take e and M as in
lemma 8. From now on let ek 2 ½0;minfe2; 15g be a sequence converging to






be Markov ek-equilibria. For any player i and k 2 N;
let rikjn be the Markov strategy which equals the tail of rik starting from
stage n:
rikjnðmÞ :¼ rik mþ n 1ð Þ 8m 2 N:
Define for all players i and for all k; n 2 N the average reward conditioned on
starting at stage n by:
gik nð Þ :¼ ci r1k jn; r2k jn;r3k jn
 
:
In view of lemma 8 we assume, without loss of generality, that, similar to the
0-equilibrium case, player 3’s average reward is essentially larger than 1, i.e.
g3k 1ð Þ ¼ c3 r1k ; r2k ; r3k
 
 1þ 2M 8k 2 N:












Bk ¼ fn 2 NjP r1k ;r2k ;r3kð Þðt
  nÞ  ffiffiffiffiek
p g:
Then Bk is a connected set of stages that contains at least the initial stage 1.







 2 BkÞ ¼ P r1k ;r2k ;r3kð Þðt
 <1Þ  P r1k ;r2k ;r3kð Þðt
 <1 and t=2BkÞ
 ð1 ffiffiffiffiek
p Þ  ffiffiffiffiek
p ¼ 1 2 ffiffiffiffiek
p
: ð7Þ
Hence the average reward is mainly determined on Bk.
Also notice that for each n 2 Bk the strategy triple r1k jn; r2k jn; r3k jn
 
is a












Therefore part 1 of lemma 8 is applicable for the triple r1k jn; r2k jn; r3k jn
 
and
yields for each player i:
ci r1k jn; r2k jn; r3k jn
 
 2M : ð8Þ
Let nk be the last stage of the first block in Bk at which player 3’s future
reward is above 1þM , i.e.
g3k 1ð Þ  1þM ; . . . ; g3k nkð Þ  1þM :
Define this first block by B3k , so B
3
k ¼ f1; 2; . . . ; nkg. Notice that either B3k ¼ Bk







 ¼ nð Þ > 0 and r3 r1k nð Þ; r2k nð Þ; r3k nð Þ
 
 1þM : ð9Þ
For any a1; a2; a3
 
2 1; 2; 3f g3; let wk a1; a2; a3
 
denote the overall proba-






; that absorption occurs in entry a1; a2; a3
 
at some stage in B3k , and let
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wk a1; a2; a3
 
(due to compactness, it suffices to deal with convergent subsequences).
Therefore, similarly to steps 4 and 5 in the 0-equilibrium case, players 2 and 3
will essentially refrain from using actions 2 and 3.
Lemma 9. wð; ; 2Þ ¼ wð; ; 3Þ ¼ 0 and wð; 2; Þ ¼ wð; 3; Þ ¼ 0.
Proof. Notice that for any n 2 B3k we have
r3ðr1kðnÞ; r2kðnÞ; 2Þ  1; r3ðr1kðnÞ;r2kðnÞ; 3Þ  1; ð10Þ
hence, by (9), we must also have
r3ðr1kðnÞ; r2kðnÞ; 1Þ  1þM : ð11Þ
We divide the proof into several steps. Below, we will consider several
deviations of the players at stages in B3k , for large k 2 N. In most
cases, the deviations consist of shifting probability from action 2 to action
1 or from action 1 to action 2. For these deviations, the distribution of t
(time of absorption) does not change because of the transition structure of
the game. (Note that the place of absorption may actually change.)
However, we also need to consider deviations when the probabilities are
shifted from action 3 (to either action 1 or action 2). Since here the
distribution of t will change, we need to examine these deviations in more
detail.
 Step 1. w ; ; 3ð Þ ¼ 0
Take an entry a1; a2; 3
 
for some a1; a2 2 1; 2; 3f g: We will show for any
k 2 N that there exist a Markov strategy s3k for player 3 for which






 c3 r1k ; r2k ; r3k
 
 wk a1; a2; 3
 
M : ð12Þ






is an ek-equilibrium, the left-hand side must be at most ek.
Taking the limit for k to 1 completes the proof.
Let ~t denote the time of absorption in entry ða1; a2; 3Þ; if no absorption








¼ wk a1; a2; 3
 
: ð13Þ
Suppose m1k is the first stage of B
3
k and consider player 3 deviating from r
3
k by
only shifting at stage m1k , the probability from action 3 to action 1. Denote
this strategy by s3;1k . Because of (10) and (11) action 3 gives at most 1 to player
3, and action 1 dominates action 2 at stage m1k . Since m
1
k 2 B3k 	 B3k we must
have that at stage m1k action 1 yields an expected reward of at least 1þM .
Therefore,






 c3 r1k ; r2k ; r3k
 
 P r1k ;r2k ;r3kð Þðt
  m1kÞ  ðð1þMÞ  1Þ




Let m2k be the second stage of B
3
k and consider player 3 deviating from r
3
k by
only shifting at stages m1k and m
2
k , the probability from action 3 to action 1.
Denote this strategy by s3;2k . Then, similarly:
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 P r1k ;r2k ;s3;1kð Þðt
  m2kÞ  ðð1þMÞ  1Þ








We can continue like this for all stages in the finite set B3k and, reaching the
final stage of that set, we have a strategy s3k which has player 3 shifting weight
from action 3 to action 1 at all stages in B3k . Then, by (13) and identifying s
3;0
k
with r3k , we get
































¼ wk a1; a2; 3
 
M :
Hence, step 1 follows.
 Step 2. w ; ; 2ð Þ ¼ 0
Take an absorbing entry a1; a2; 2
 
for some a1; a2 2 1; 2; 3f g: Consider a
deviation by player 3 from r3k that consists of shifting the probability from
action 2 to action 1 at all stages in B3k : Then his reward would increase, in
view of (10) and (11), by at least
wk a1; a2; 2
 
 1þMð Þ  1½ :






is an ek-equilibrium, this expression must be at most ek.
Taking the limit for k to 1 completes the proof.
 Step 3. w ; 3; ð Þ ¼ 0
Notice that it is enough to show w ; 3; 1ð Þ ¼ 0, because of steps 1 and 2.
Consider a deviation by player 1 from r1k that consists of shifting the
probability from action 1 to action 2 at all stages in B3k : Then he would gain
at least












is an ek-equilibrium, this expression must be at most ek.
Taking the limit for k to 1 yields wð1; 3; 1Þ ¼ 0.
Consider player 2 deviating by shifting the probability from action 3 to
action 1 at all stages in B3k : In fact, by using that wð1; 3; 1Þ ¼ 0, and the




wk 2; 3; 1ð Þ þ wkð3; 3; 1Þ½   M  0½ :






is an ek-equilibrium, this expression must be at most ek.
Taking the limit for k to 1 yields wk 2; 3; 1ð Þ ¼ wkð3; 3; 1Þ ¼ 0, which com-
pletes the proof.
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 Step 4. w ; 2; ð Þ ¼ 0
Notice that it is enough to show w 3; 2; 1ð Þ ¼ 0, because of steps 1 and 2.
Consider player 2 deviating by shifting the probability from action 2 to
action 1 at all stages in B3k : By doing so he could gain at least
wk 3; 2; 1ð Þ  3 1½ :






is an ek-equilibrium, this expression must be at most ek.
Taking the limit for k to 1 completes the proof. h
Now we are ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 10. Consider example 2 (under Assumption 1). There exist no
e-equilibria for small e > 0:
Proof. Suppose the opposite. Let ek be a positive sequence converging to 0.
Then by corollary 5 there exists a Markov ek-equilibrium ðr1k ; r2k ; r3kÞ for all
k 2 N.
We will now use the notations of lemma 9. By disregarding symmetric
cases and taking a subsequence, in view of lemma 8, we may assume that
ek 2 ½0;minfe2; 15g and
g3kð1Þ ¼ c3ðr1k ; r2k ; r3kÞ  1þ 2M for all k 2 N: ð14Þ






















wk a1; a2; a3
 
;
we have that there is an absorbing entry a1; a2; a3
 
for which
w a1; a2; a3
 
> 0. By lemma 9 we conclude that a1; a2; a3
 
¼ ð3; 1; 1Þ since w
is 0 in all other entries. Therefore, player 3’s average reward conditioned on
absorption in B3k goes to 0. This contradicts the fact that, given absorption at
any stage in B3k player 3 would get at least 1þM .
Observe that
g3k 1ð Þ  P r1k ;r2k ;r3kð Þ t
 2 B3k
 
 3þ P r1k ;r2k ;r3kð Þ t
 2 B3k  B3k
 
 1þMð Þ
þ P r1k ;r2k ;r3kð Þ t
 =2 B3k
 
 g3k nk þ 1ð Þ:
Recall that either g3k nk þ 1ð Þ < 1þM or B3k ¼ Bk . In the latter case, recall











g3k 1ð Þ  1þM ;
which contradicts (14). So, the proof is complete. h
Remark. For 3-player absorbing games under the assumption of full moni-
toring, Solan (1999) has shown the existence of e -equilibria for all e > 0.
However, it is crucial that the players are able to observe the actions of the
other players.
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We wish to remark that example 2 has some similarity with an example
examined in Flesch et al. (1997), but the latter example can not be used for the
purposes of this paper.
Finally, it should be noted that the situation for 2-player stochastic games
under Assumption 1 remains unclear and subject to further study.
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